

Felix Schleef

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Research Fields

Quantitative Marketing

Digital Economics

Industrial Organization

References

Michelangelo Rossi

Associate Professor, HEC Paris

rossim@hec.fr

Yves Le Yaouanq

Associate Professor, École Polytechnique

yves.le-yaouanq@polytechnique.edu

Marc Bourreau

Professor, Télécom Paris

marc.bourreau@telecom-paris.fr

Thibaud Vergé

Vice President, Autorité de la Concurrence

thibaud.verge@ensae.fr

Academic Appointments

HEC Paris

Hi! Paris Postdoctoral Fellow

Jouy-en-Josas, FR

since 01/2026

Studies

CREST - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

PhD Economics

Palaiseau, FR

10/2020–09/2024

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

M.Sc Economics

Munich, DE

10/2018–09/2020

○ Semester abroad at École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay - joint program with HEC, École Polytechnique and ENSAE

University of Mannheim

B.Sc Economics

Mannheim, DE

09/2014–08/2017

Scientific Articles

Quality Disclosures and Disappointment: Evidence from the Academy Awards

with Michelangelo Rossi, 2026, *Management Science*

Working Papers

Consumer Choice between Recommendation Algorithms - Experimental Evidence - [Draft]

Abstract: Regulators are increasingly concerned with the power of large online platforms to bias consumer

recommendations. In light of these concerns, I study mechanisms to give consumers control over recommendation algorithms as a potential avenue for regulation using an online experiment. In the experimental setting, an algorithm that ranks items by estimated consumer surplus leads to better outcomes for the subjects than an algorithm that weighs consumer surplus and a cost-minimization objective. When faced with a costly choice between two recommendation algorithms, subjects have a positive willingness-to-pay for a better recommendation algorithm. However, subjects underestimate the potential gain from the better recommendation algorithm. These findings suggest, that giving consumers power over recommendation algorithms to curtail potential abuse is not straightforward. It may be a viable business for platforms to themselves to offer improved recommendation algorithms to consumers for a fee.

Competition and Organizational Form Choice: Evidence from Fast Food Chains

Abstract: The majority of franchise firms employ a dual distribution strategy: a share of the outlets are owned and operated by franchisees, which are entrepreneurs bound to the franchise firm by contractual agreement, while the rest are owned by the franchise firm outright and operated by employed managers. This organizational form choice has potential consequences for firm performance, investment and consumer welfare, since economic theory suggests that employed managers have lower incentives to exert effort compared to franchisees. A large literature explores potential factors that may affect this organizational form decision. However, little has been written about the effect of product market competition on organizational form choice. I study this question empirically using data on fast-food chains in Germany. Reduced-form regressions reveal that a larger number of competitors positively correlates with outlets being manager-operated. To address the concern that unobserved market profitability may both affect the number of competitors and the organizational form decision, I employ a profit inequality approach that allows me to account for unobservable market characteristics. The results from the profit inequality approach corroborate that franchise firms rely more on employed managers in markets where there are many competitors.

Work in Progress

Exploration Bias in Recommendation Systems

with Marc Bourreau and Michelangelo Rossi

Teaching Experience

École Polytechnique

Applied Econometrics (M.Sc in Economics)

2021, 2022, 2023

Teaching Fellow for Professor Pauline Rossi

Industrial Organization (M.Sc in Economics)

2020, 2021, 2022

Teaching Fellow for Professor Marie-Laure Allain

ENSAE

Microeconomics 1 (M.Sc in Economics)

2020, 2021, 2022

Teaching Fellow for Professor Philippe Choné and Professor Laurent Linnemer

Conferences and Seminars

2026 (upcoming): Platform Stratey Research Symposium (Boston), SWIMS (Hong Kong), EARIE (Mannheim), ESA (Barcelona), CESifo Workshop Digital Platforms (Warwick)

2025: MaCCI Annual Conference (Mannheim)

2024: Doctoral Workshop on The Economics of Digitization (Warsaw), Workshop on Platforms

and Recommender Systems (Paris)

2023: EARIE (Rome), ESA (Lyon), Workshop on Interactions of Humans and Algorithms (Berlin)

2022: EARIE (Vienna), Jornadas de Economía Industrial (Gran Canaria)

Experience

RBB Economics

Associate

Paris, FR

02/2025 – 12/2025

ifo Institute

Research Assistant

Munich, DE

10/2018 – 7/2019

German Parliament

Intern

Berlin, DE

09/2018 – 10/2018

McKinsey & Company

Research Analyst

Düsseldorf, DE

10/2017 – 09/2018

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Research Assistant

Mannheim, DE

02/2017 – 09/2017

John Deere Financial

Intern

Bruchsal, DE

06/2016 – 09/2016

Skills

Languages: German (Native), English (Fluent), French (Advanced)

Programming: Python [pandas, scikit-learn], Stata, R [dplyr, ggplot], QGIS, Git, Latex